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Reflections on the Doctrinal and Big-Picture Issues 
Raised by the Constitutional Challenges to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) 
Vikram David Amar* 
The challenges to the federal healthcare statute enacted last year, 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or Act),1 
that are currently winding their way through the federal courts — and 
the few decisions that have embraced these challenges so far2 — appear 
to suffer from a problematic blend of doctrinal hypertechnicality, 
theoretical imprecision, and (understandable but misplaced) fear of 
an all-powerful Congress.  None of this is to say it will be impossible 
for any of these challenges ultimately to succeed.  Instead, it is to say 
that any such success would either be revolutionary (in the way that 
Justice Clarence Thomas’ desire to return to nineteenth century cases 
concerning the scope of federal power would, if implemented, com-
pletely upend the current constitutional convention),3 or it would be 
tailored to reach a particular result on a particular contentious issue 
(in the way Bush v. Gore4 is viewed by many as a ruling good for only 
one day and one election). 
To date, the prominent challenges to the PPACA sound, as a 
matter of law if not political rhetoric, in federalism rather than a 
rights-based libertarianism.  As anyone following these litigations 
knows, the focal point for the constitutional attacks has been the so-
                                                                                                                           
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law.  I 
thank the organizers of the Florida International University School of Law for inviting my par-
ticipation in the symposium on the healthcare law challenges held in Florida in late 2010.  Al-
though I was unable to attend the event in person, I have profited from reading the papers of 
some of the other presenters. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 2 See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067, 2011 WL 
3519178 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011); Virginia v. Sebelius 728 F. Supp. 2d. 768 (E.D. Va. 2010); 
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (N.D. Fla. 2011). 
 3 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57-61 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 4 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
10 FIU Law Review [6:9 
called individual mandate provision of the federal statute — the provi-
sion that requires individuals to procure basic health insurance lest 
they be obligated to pay a prescribed amount of money into the fed-
eral Treasury.5  More specifically, the plaintiffs challenging the Act 
deny that Congress enjoys any enumerated power to impose such a 
mandate.6 
The plaintiffs seem to concede that Congress ordinarily has great 
latitude to regulate matters that bear on the national economy, even 
when the things being regulated occur entirely intrastate.  And all 
aspects of the healthcare system, regardless of where the key actors 
and institutions happen to be physically located, are undeniably signif-
icant and interconnected components of a national supply and de-
mand market for healthcare goods and services that comprises a very 
large portion of America’s gross domestic product.  So, generally 
speaking, congressional reform relating to healthcare insurers, con-
sumers and providers — because these insurers, consumers and pro-
viders are so tightly linked across the several states — does not run 
afoul of the Tenth Amendment. 
Apparently recognizing this overriding reality — that Congress’ 
end with respect to healthcare reform is “legitimate,” as the Court 
famously required in McCulloch v. Maryland7 — the plaintiffs attack 
the congressionally-chosen means, i.e., the mandate, as constitutional-
ly improper.  Plaintiffs do not assert that the individual mandate fails 
to further Congress’ end and is thus not “plainly adapted” to it in that 
sense;8 instead, the challengers argue that the means utilized by Con-
gress violate another (until now unstated) requirement for Commerce 
Clause regulation, that Congress refrain from regulating “inactivity.”  
Implicit in the plaintiffs’ argument is that compelling people who are 
refraining from the procurement or purchase of health insurance is 
not, again to use the words of McCulloch, “consist[tent] with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution,”9 at least as far as Commerce Clause 
power is concerned.  It thus becomes crucial to examine this require-
ment upon which the challengers insist — that Congress confine itself 
to regulating preexisting active conduct by individuals, as opposed to 
regulating individuals’ decisions not to purchase health insurance. 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501 (requiring, subject to minor excep-
tions, all citizens and others lawfully residing in the United States to carry a specified minimal 
level of health insurance coverage or pay money to the Treasury). 
 6 See Virginia v. Sebelius 728 F. Supp. 2d. 768 (E.D. Va. 2010); Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) 
(N.D. Fla. 2011). 
 7 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
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I.  THE LEGAL THEORIES 
A. The Source of the Proffered Distinction Between Regulation of 
Activity and Compulsion of Activity 
Challengers to the PPACA derive their so-called activity re-
quirement a few different ways.  First, they point out that the “federal 
government has never attempted to regulate inactivity, or a person’s 
mere existence within our Nation’s boundaries, under the auspices of 
the Commerce Clause.”10  Second, they sometimes argue that the 
grant of Congress to “regulate commerce” textually presupposes that 
some active commerce exists on the part of the regulated person(s) 
before Congress has authority to step in and regulate.  Finally, they 
seem to rely on the extent to which the Supreme Court itself, in the 
trio of major Commerce Clause cases over the past 15 years, has spent 
time and energy analyzing whether that which Congress has chosen to 
regulate was economic/commercial “activity,” before deferring to 
Congress’ determination that the aggregated effects of the regulation 
in question influence interstate commerce sufficiently to permit fed-
eral legislation.11   
Each of these sources of an activity requirement is problematic.  
As to the first, there is an inadequate explanation of why novelty 
equates with unconstitutionality.  To be sure, if a congressional prac-
tice is deeply rooted in history, especially history dating back to the 
founding, then such a history may tend to cut in favor of the law’s 
constitutionality.  Laws without such statutory precedent may thus 
lack one argument in their favor,12 but of course all congressional laws 
— even novel ones — come to the federal courts bearing a presumption 
of constitutionality.13  And the challengers must do more than charac-
terize a law as newfangled to defeat that presumption. 
More importantly, the novelty objection, such as it is, dissolves 
when we expand our focus to include all congressional regulation and 
not just regulation under the Commerce Clause.  Tellingly, challen-
gers to the Act offer no explanation for why an activity requirement 
should be engrafted onto the Commerce Clause in particular, if no 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 891 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
 11 See Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d. 768,771-72, 778-79 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 12 Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (noting how the "take title" 
provision of the federal statute at issue "appears to be unique[ ] [in that] [n]o other federal 
statute has been cited which offers a state government no option other than that of implement-
ing legislation enacted by Congress.").  
 13 Even the district court judge in Virginia v. Sebelius purported to concede this point.  See 
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp 2d. at 774 (“[T]he Secretary correctly asks the Court to be mindful that it 
must presume the constitutionality of federal legislation.”). 
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such requirement encumbers congressional lawmaking discretion 
more generally.  If Congress is authorized to pass, and has in fact 
passed, laws regulating inactivity — that is, laws mandating affirmative 
activity — under other of its enumerated powers, such a practice would 
tend to argue against constitutional recognition of an activity re-
quirement, unless the other fonts of federal power under which inac-
tivity has been regulated can be shown to be textually, historically, or 
structurally distinguishable from the Commerce Clause.  Thus, the 
fact that Congress can mandate military, militia, and jury service, as 
well as participation in the census14 — even though the Tenth Amend-
ment and federalism principles, the same principles that undergird 
limits on congressional power under the Commerce Clause, insist on 
enumerated authority for these regulations — would seem to require 
more of an explanation than the challengers to the Act have thus far 
offered. 
It would not do to suggest that these other, permissible, congres-
sional mandates do not involve compelled purchases (as if that mat-
tered).  As many have pointed out, early federal militia Acts — laws no 
one seems eager to question — required would-be militia members, 
who were doing no more than being, to show up for service outfitted 
with a minimum prescribed set of equipment, equipment that the in-
dividual was responsible for acquiring, that is, affirmatively obtaining, 
most likely through purchase.  For example, the Militia Act of 179215 
required able-bodied men to become Federal militia members, who 
were then required to arm themselves with a musket, bayonet and 
belt, two spare flints, a cartridge box with 24 bullets, and a knapsack. 
Men owning rifles were required to provide a powder horn, 1/4 pound 
of gun powder, 20 rifle balls, a shooting pouch, and a knapsack.16 
Nor does the constitutional text under which the military draft, 
militia service, jury service, or census participation are mandated ex-
plain why affirmative conduct can be required in those realms but not 
under the Commerce Clause.  Article I permits Congress to “raise and 
support” Armies, but there is nothing in the text of this clause that 
indicates why mandatory military service is permissible.17  “Raise and 
support” could be read to mean “create incentives to voluntarily in-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
 15 Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271. 
 16 Eminent domain by the federal government, surely authorized in order to implement 
other permissible federal objectives, also requires a compelled transaction, depriving the indi-
vidual of choice over how to spend his resources.  Remember, too, that land is unique, so that a 
forced exchange of land for money leaves the unhappy former landowner less pleased than 
before the compelled transaction. 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
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duce.”  But the Supreme Court had little trouble holding in 1925 that 
this clause, combined with the Necessary and Proper clause, permitted 
Congress to mandate service — to regulate inactivity — because Con-
gress should not be dependent on the inclinations and reluctances of 
individuals to accomplish Article I’s enumerated objectives.18 
More generally, the word “regulate” does not foreclose compul-
sion of activity, including compulsion of commercial activity.  “Regu-
late” in modern dictionaries means, among other things, to “direct.”19  
When we turn to the Constitution itself as a possible dictionary,20 we 
see that it uses the word “regulate” at least sometimes in ways that 
include a power to mandate activity.  The militia in which Congress 
can compel membership, for example, is referred to as one that is 
“well[-]regulated” in the Second Amendment.21  Congress’ power in 
Article I to “regulate the [v]alue” of money22 would seem to permit 
Congress, under certain circumstances, to require individuals to ex-
change their currency for something else Congress reasonably be-
lieves would provide stability to the monetary system of the country.  
Congress’ power to adopt rules for the “[r]egulation” of the land and 
naval forces23 undeniably allows Congress to mandate activity on the 
part of otherwise disinclined men and women in the armed forces, 
when such mandates are reasonably helpful to the national defense.  
Congress’ “[r]egulation[ ]” of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion24 would seem to permit Congress to require the Supreme Court to 
affirmatively act.  And “needful Rules and Regulations respecting” 
federal properties25 would, the Court has said, include all those things 
that states can do under their police powers,26 and challengers to the 
healthcare law do not in their complaints challenge the power of 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (“[A] governmental power which 
has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to 
its exertion is in no substantial sense a power.”). 
 19 See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1172 (4th ed. 2004). 
 20 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 791 (1999) 
(discussing the utility of using the Constitution itself as a dictionary of sorts). 
 21 U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Bill of Rights provisions more generally show that when the 
Constitution refers to conduct, it also means to include the absence of such conduct.  The right 
to freedom of speech includes the freedom not to speak.  The right to procreate subsumes the 
right not to procreate.  An argument can be made that just as this is true for rights, so too should 
it generally be true for powers: the power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate 
non-commerce. 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 24 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 26 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) (“[T]he [federal] [g]overnment 
doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several [s]tates 
. . . .”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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states, such as Massachusetts, to mandate purchase of healthcare, just 
as states can mandate vaccination and compulsory education under 
the police power.27 
The claim I make here is not that the power to regulate com-
merce always includes the power to mandate commerce, or that all 
mandates are “necessary and proper” regulations of commerce.  But I 
needn’t prove all mandates are permissible; the challengers to the 
healthcare act are arguing — and have to be arguing — that all man-
dates (save, I assume, those they can’t dispute) are unconstitutional.  
My point here is only that there is nothing in the text or history of the 
Constitution, viewed as a whole and examined with specific reference 
to the power to “regulate,” that supports this argument.  Regulation 
can, at least sometimes, take the form of mandates.  And so it is in-
cumbent on the challengers to explain why the healthcare law is not 
one of them.  In fact, as I argue below, the PPACA mandate is one of 
the most natural and defensible kinds of mandates, so that if other 
regulatory mandates are permissible, this one should be permissible a 
fortiori. 
The final possible source of an anti-mandate, activity require-
ment, recent Supreme Court cases, does not help PPACA opponents 
make the kind of required explanation.  It is true that in United States 
v. Lopez28 and United States v. Morrison,29 in striking down the Gun-
Free Schools Zones Act (GFSZA) and the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA), respectively, the Court highlighted the fact that the 
subjects of congressional regulation (possession of guns near schools 
and the commission of gender-motivated violence), did not constitute 
“economic activity.”  And in Gonzales v. Raich,30 in distinguishing Lo-
pez and Morrison en route to upholding the Controlled Substance 
Act’s (CSA) federal criminalization of all manufacture, sale, distribu-
tion, or possession of marijuana, the Court emphasized that the CSA 
dealt with “economic activity.”31  
The question raised by the PPACA challengers’ reliance on these 
cases, however, is whether the Court meant to use the term “econom-
ic activity” in the kind of intentional and unyielding way the Act’s 
challengers suggest.  In the cases themselves — Lopez, Morrison and 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See supra note 3. The fact that states can mandate activity demonstrates that the Ameri-
can law does not, contrary to what some PPACA challengers allege, generally embody a distinc-
tion between action and inaction.  Sometimes the law forbids compelled action, but there is no 
general legal, or constitutional, aversion to activity requirements. 
 28 514 U.S. 549, 551, 561 (1995). 
 29 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
 30 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 31 Id. at 25. 
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Raich — the Court’s focus was on whether the regulated activity was 
economic, not whether it was an activity.  Would the PPACA challen-
gers pack up and go home had the Court in these cases — as it very 
well might have done for purposes of those disputes — used the term 
“economic matters” or “economic decisions” to describe the things 
Congress has broad latitude to regulate?  Or what if the Court had 
simply said Congress can regulate “economics” under the Commerce 
Clause?  In Raich, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, said that 
“[e]conomics’ refers to the production, distribution, and consumption 
of commodities.’”32  He wrote that sentence right after he asserted 
that “[u]nlike those [activities] at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the 
activities regulated by the CSA [at issue in Raich] are quintessentially 
economic.”33  He might have meant to use the noun “economics” to 
help give meaning to the adjective “economic” in the term “economic 
activity,” and not have intended a relaxation of any independent re-
quirement of activity.  Or he might have meant to substitute “eco-
nomics” for “economic activity” altogether, in which case the question 
would become whether the mandate provision of the PPACA regu-
lates production, distribution, or consumption of a commodity, re-
gardless of whether that which the mandate regulates is an activity or 
not. 
Indeed, if we give meaning to economic activity by reference to 
“consumption,” in addition to production and distribution (as Raich 
suggests we should), then individuals who do no more than exist are 
engaging in the activity of consumption of healthcare in the sense that 
they benefit from and free ride on the healthcare system’s creation 
and maintenance by the rest of us.  The key policy reason Congress 
created the mandate could easily be seen to be twofold: (1) people 
without insurance have an incentive to be a freeloader because they 
know that they will be treated in a healthcare emergency, either be-
cause they know that society won’t sit idly by and watch them die, or 
because the condition from which they suffer might be contagious or 
have other spillover effects threatening the health and safety of other 
people; and (2) people without insurance have inadequate incentive 
to deal with small health problems before they become large ones 
(because they must pay for healthcare treatments out of pocket), and 
thus they tend to be more dangerous to the rest of us by spreading 
preventable diseases and/or engaging in potentially dangerous activi-
ties on account of pain or disability.  These incentive problems are 
increased greatly by another part of PPACA, the provision that pre-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). 
 33 Id. 
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vents health insurance companies from discriminating against persons 
with so-called preexisting conditions.34  Because people know they can 
purchase insurance after, rather than before, they become seriously ill 
or injured, they are even more likely to free ride until that acute need 
arises.  If these incentive problems might describe reality, and certain-
ly Congress could and did reasonably believe that they do, then 
people who decide not to obtain health insurance nonetheless are 
consuming healthcare in the sense that they benefit by it.35  Health-
care, like national defense and democracy, is a public good in this 
sense, and it is consumed as much by inactivity as by activity.  
B. The Elasticity of the Definition of “Activity” 
This last observation points up the difficulty of even defining 
what activity means for these purposes.  Assuming, arguendo, that 
breathing isn’t an activity (because it isn’t volitional enough), and 
freeloading doesn’t count as an activity (because it is too passive) — 
and neither of these conclusions is obvious — consider another subject 
of Commerce Clause regulation that has been upheld by the Court, 
even by the Court that decided Lopez and Morrison, without much 
fanfare:  discrimination in the buying or selling of goods and services.  
Congress, under the Commerce Clause, often makes it unlawful to 
discriminate on the basis of, say, race in the making of contracts.36  In 
his dissent in Morrison, Justice Breyer questioned whether Congress 
was regulating “economic activity” in these settings, his question be-
ing whether discrimination was “economic” or instead was driven by 
other motives.37  I focus here not on whether race discrimination is 
economic, but rather whether discrimination against certain persons 
or things is always easily capable of characterization as activity.  From 
one angle, a ban on discrimination poses no problem to the challen-
gers of the healthcare Act, insofar as “the making of contracts” is con-
                                                                                                                           
 34 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2011). 
 35 Another (and related) interesting possibility that co-symposium invitee Gerard Mag-
liocca raises is that self-insurance be considered activity.  See Gerard N. Magliocca, The Private 
Action Requirement 6 FIU L. REV. 1 (2011).  And a very plausible argument can be made that 
since the tax penalty imposed by the Act applies only to people who are obligated to file a tax 
return, the activity that is being regulated is the activity that triggers the requirement to file a tax 
return.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 
124 Stat. 119, 242, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-152, § 1002(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1029, 1032.  If the law requiring people to file tax returns is 
not an impermissible mandate, then neither is a law requiring people who must file returns to 
purchase insurance. 
 36 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
 37 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 658 (2000) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Sou-
ter and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
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sidered an activity.  But isn’t Congress — when it prohibits discrimina-
tion — essentially forcing people to engage in transactions that they’d 
rather not undertake?  If a person declines to buy from a seller be-
cause the seller is black, an antidiscrimination law, in effect, mandates 
that he buy.  Of course, the technical rejoinder would be that the re-
gulated individual could simply escape the purchase mandate by 
choosing not to buy at all; it is still a volitional decision he makes 
about whether to enter into any purchase agreements with anyone at 
all.  But is this rejoinder persuasive?  Do people really have a choice 
not to buy food, or shelter, or clothing?  And in any event, would 
challengers to the PPACA be satisfied if Congress rewrote the 
mandate in antidiscrimination terms?  “No citizen shall discriminate, 
in the goods and services he purchases, against healthcare policies 
offered by insurers.”  In other words, if you buy anything, you’ve got 
to buy healthcare. 
The ease with which Congress could rewrite the mandate provi-
sion to satisfy any activity requirement that any court imposed raises, 
I think, some big questions about why any such requirement should 
exist.  For example, in addition to styling the mandate in non-
discrimination terms, Congress could make use of the so-called “juris-
dictional element” device the Court has spoken favorably of in Lopez 
and Morrison.38  Imagine Congress had said: “People who have not 
purchased healthcare may not enter into any workplace or place of 
business open to the public, and may not travel on roadways that con-
nect to interstate transportation systems, else they pay a fee to the 
federal Treasury.”  Would this be any less of a mandate in reality?  
Do people have a choice not to interact with other people, or use 
roads and channels of transportation and commerce?  And yet, this 
kind of a law would likely be upheld under current doctrine, and even 
under the plaintiffs’ theories.  Indeed, the kind of jurisdictional ele-
ment I describe here is much less gimmicky than others that have 
been approved,39 insofar as the jurisdictional element of interaction 
with other people captures quite nicely Congress’ authentic policy 
reasons for wanting to mandate healthcare coverage — to reduce the 
spillover effects that arise when people without insurance have inade-
quate incentive to take care of themselves and thus place the rest of us 
in the position of being vulnerable to health and/or economic costs 
when we interact with them.  Surely this jurisdictional element is 
much more proximately related to the permissible reason Congress is 
regulating in the healthcare realm than, in the context of Morrison, 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 & n.5. 
 39 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5. 
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was the part of the law that made it a federal crime to cross a state 
line to inflict gender-motivated violence.  The interstate travel really 
has no logical relationship to any commercial reason Congress might 
want to regulate gender-motivated violence.40 
Perhaps an argument could be made that requiring Congress to 
go through these drafting gymnastics to satisfy an activity requirement 
would serve federalism values underlying the Tenth Amendment and 
the doctrine of limited, enumerated federal powers.  It’s hard to see 
why that would be so.  Sometimes encouraging Congress to make cer-
tain findings, or write its statutory text in certain ways, does carry with 
it the benefit of making Congress contemplate and weigh federalism 
values and/or put the affected states and American votes on clear no-
tice that Congress is legislating in a way that might alter traditional 
mixes of federal and state regulatory exercise.41  But the salutary pro-
cedural benefits that explain, for example, the plain-statement re-
quirements that must be met before direct regulatory restrictions or 
spending conditions are imposed on state governmental entities, do 
not seem to argue in favor of redrafting the healthcare mandate provi-
sion along the lines suggested above.  No one denies that the health-
care Act reflected a substantial new Congressional regulation in the 
healthcare sector, and no one could deny that the mandate aspect of 
the law and its effect on individuals and states was fully appreciated, 
considered, and vetted by Congress.  Nor could anyone argue that the 
mandate provision in particular was not well understood and adver-
tised to the states and the American people; the provision did not, to 
use Marshall’s words in McCulloch again, “steal upon an unsuspecting 
legislature, and pass unobserved” by either opponents in Congress or 
among the American electorate.42 
Given that everybody knew what Congress was requiring and 
why, the issue should be whether Congress can require it, not the par-
ticular words Congress uses to style the requirement.  
Before I leave the major Commerce Clause cases and how the 
doctrinal nuances they embody bear on the PPACA challenges now 
pending, I should mention that just as the idea of congressional regu-
lation of inactivity may, as challengers allege, be somewhat novel, so 
too is the idea that such a distinction between activity and inactivity 
should matter.  That is to say, while no Supreme Court opinion may 
have upheld congressional Commerce Clause regulation of mere “be-
                                                                                                                           
 40 Cf. id. 
 41 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (adopting plain-statement rule 
for laws that subject state governments to federal regulation); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 
203, 203 (1987) (reiterating plain-statement rule for conditions on state receipt of federal funds). 
 42 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819). 
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ing” of the kind found in the mandate, neither has any Supreme Court 
opinion struck something like this down.  Indeed, to the extent that 
the Court has found occasion to discuss anything coming close to the 
activity/inactivity distinction in the Commerce Clause realm, the most 
relevant discussion is not the (perhaps careless) use of the phrase 
“economic activity” in cases like Lopez, Morrison and Raich, but ra-
ther the discussion of the permissibility of congressional regulation in 
Wickard v. Filburn.43  In that case, the Court upheld the limits the fed-
eral government placed on a small farmer’s wheat acreage against the 
challenge that the allotment as applied to someone who was not sell-
ing wheat into the market lacked enumerated federal power behind it.  
Although healthcare Act challengers would surely point out that the 
marketing quota challenged in Wickard prevented the farmer from, as 
a technical matter, raising crops (an activity), they must also reckon 
with the Court’s quite explicit reasoning for permitting the quota:  the 
creation of new transactions that would ensue because people who 
couldn’t cultivate their own plots would be forced into the market.  As 
the Court observed, “[t]he stimulation of commerce is a use of the 
regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions 
thereon.”44  Earlier cases had abandoned any distinction between reg-
ulation of commerce and prohibition of it.45  Wickard, fully in keeping 
with the other uses of the word “regulate” in the Constitution de-
scribed above, makes clear that the commerce that Congress can regu-
late need not have preexisted before the congressional regulation in 
question; Congress can regulate commerce by “creating” commerce, 
by setting conditions that generate transactions that never otherwise 
would have occurred.  If Congress can force transactions indirectly by 
prohibiting self-help, why can it not do so more directly by openly 
requiring the transactions themselves.   Indeed, the case for congres-
sional regulation seems even stronger in healthcare than in Wickard, 
insofar as the farmer in Wickard wasn’t a free-rider but a true market 
non-participant, and even that status was reachable by Congress, ac-
cording to the Court.46 
                                                                                                                           
 43 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 44 Id. at 128. 
 45 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 46 At times, PPACA challengers identify the key question to be whether “inactivity is 
commerce.”  But the foregoing discussion makes clear that the relevant question is whether 
“regulate” can include “compel.”  The purchase of healthcare is undeniably commerce; the issue 
is whether requiring such commerce is “regulating” it.  And if regulation includes compulsion — 
and the evidence adduced above suggests that it certainly can — then the only fallback argument 
on which challengers can rely is that there is something distinctively wrong with the PPACA’s 
particular mandate. 
20 FIU Law Review [6:9 
C. Functional/Theoretical Examinations of Distinction 
When we move from particular cases to the larger reasoning as-
serted in support of an activity requirement, the proffered distinction 
between congressional regulation of activity and inactivity doesn’t 
appear to fare much better. 
One (maybe the) major functional argument asserted by suppor-
ters to justify the recognition (I would argue creation) of an activi-
ty/inactivity line is a variant on the classic slippery slope metaphor.  
Such a line is needed, they say, because without it Congress could do 
anything it wanted, and the concept of limited, enumerated powers 
and the Tenth Amendment would go by the boards.  As Randy Bar-
nett has put things: in the absence of such a distinction,  
Congress can mandate individuals do virtually anything at all on 
the grounds that the failure to engage in economic activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.  Therefore, [a theory that 
permits the healthcare law] would effectively obliterate, once 
and for all, the enumerated powers scheme that even the New 
Deal Court did not abandon.47 
I well understand the felt need for some tool for the courts to 
keep Congress within some finite bounds.  As I have written else-
where,48 I do not think the so-called “political safeguards” argument 
advanced by the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority49 — to the effect that states do not need judicial protection 
because state government has adequate leverage over the federal 
government due to the role state governmental actors play in the se-
lection of federal officials — works in today’s world.  Nor do I agree 
with Justice Breyer’s dissenting argument in Morrison that, given 
changes in the world, it would be constitutionally unproblematic to 
say Congress should be able to reach any conduct no matter where it 
takes place and no matter how remote the effect it has on interstate 
economic markets.50 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 607 (2010). 
 48 See Vikram David Amar, Some Questions and Answers Concerning Justice Blackmun in 
Federalism and Separation of Powers, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 158 (1998). 
 49 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 50 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 660 (2000) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Sou-
ter and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).  I should add, though, that even as courts play a useful role, a 
meaningful answer to the slippery-slope problem relies heavily on political common sense — the 
notion that many far-fetched laws would never be adopted in the world we know.  For instance, 
challengers to the healthcare Act are fond of saying that if Congress can require healthcare, it 
can require that we all eat broccoli.  But under current doctrine (and even embracing the so-
called activity requirement healthcare challengers offer), Congress could undeniably prohibit the 
eating (and production, sale and distribution) of all broccoli.  The unlikely prospect of Congress 
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But while I think courts should not abdicate a robust role in po-
licing the boundaries of federalism, I think the tools judges should use 
must be of the right shape and size for the job.  The activity/inactivity 
device is inapt because it is neither required, nor particularly useful, in 
separating the permissible from the impermissible exercises of con-
gressional authority. 
The activity/inactivity line can’t be absolutely necessary (as its 
proponents seem to claim) to prevent Congress from having bound-
less power, because Lopez and Morrison conclusively demonstrate 
that the Court can say “no” to Congress even where activity is in-
volved.  In other words, there is no question but that the activity re-
quirement was satisfied in Morrison, and yet the Court still struck the 
Violence Against Women Act down on the (more plausible) ground 
that the regulated activity was not sufficiently connected to com-
merce.51  In other words, the result and analysis in Morrison conclu-
sively demonstrated that there are tools other than the activi-
ty/inactivity line that allow the courts to police Congress. 
Of course, additional tools are welcome where they are helpful to 
the task involved.  But just as the activity/inactivity line is not re-
quired, neither is it remotely sufficient.  Consider, for example, a 
Congressional law that requires young persons to show up for military 
service.  So far, so good — Congress’ power to raise and support mili-
tary troops has been understood to justify the draft.52  As discussed 
above, that breach of the activity/inactivity line is difficult enough for 
healthcare challengers to explain away.  But imagine further that 
Congress mandates that the men and women who might be drafted 
must procure health insurance because the government wants to make 
sure its future draftees are fit and ready for action right away.  If re-
quired health insurance is permissible under this reasoning, then the 
challenge to the PPACA disappears because, of course, Congress is 
entitled to use not just the Commerce Clause but rather all powers 
within its enumerated panoply.  And if required healthcare is not jus-
tifiable under the power to raise armies, that result certainly is not 
because of any activity/inactivity distinction; the draft itself obliterates 
that line.  Instead, it is because the relationship between raising ar-
mies and required healthcare is too strained. 
Or imagine further that Congress mandated that all persons eat 
at least two servings of green vegetables and exercise vigorously for at 
                                                                                                                           
prohibiting broccoli consumption doesn't keep us up at night; the equally unlikely prospect of 
Congress mandating such consumption needn’t either. 
 51 Id. at 613 (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity.”).  
 52 See supra note 18. 
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least half an hour per day on the theory that potential military troops 
need to be well nourished and healthy.  And so forth.  If Congress is 
to be reined in from requiring whatever it might dream up — that is, if 
Congress is to be prohibited from doing anything and everything it 
might want — the limit cannot be found in any activity/inactivity line, 
but rather some notion that there must be a proximate nexus between 
the power Congress is given in the Constitution and the means Con-
gress has chosen to implement that power.  Notions of proximate rela-
tionship — a limit on attenuation, if you will — make some sense and 
probably do a good job of explaining the results in cases like Lopez 
and Morrison.  But if requirements of proximity and limits on attenu-
ation are needed and sensible, they demonstrate that the proffered 
activity/inactivity line isn’t doing, and really can’t do, the work.  
To paraphrase Justice Blackmun in Garcia, the proffered test be-
tween activity and inactivity is not just “unworkable in practice” but 
also “unsound in principle.”53 
None of this is to say that all congressional mandates are consti-
tutionally permissible so long as they advance some otherwise legiti-
mate federal goal.  The Constitution itself, in some of its provisions 
and doctrines, prevents Congress from coercing certain kinds of ac-
tion.  As Professor Magliocca points out, for example, the Third 
Amendment prohibits the quartering of troops in private homes dur-
ing peacetime, the Fifth Amendment prevents government from 
mandating self-incrimination and the surrender of property without 
just compensation,54  the First Amendment prohibits government from 
mandating that individuals be vessels for government speech,55 and 
the Supreme Court has held in the so-called anti-commandeering cas-
es, New York v. United States56 and Printz v. United States,57 that fede-
ralism principles prohibit Congress from mandating that state gov-
ernments exercise their regulatory power on behalf of federal goals.  
On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, the federal government can 
mandate taxes, and jury and military service, among others, even if 
the individuals so mandated are doing nothing other than being. 
The question then becomes: when is a mandate that would in fact 
promote a legitimate end nonetheless constitutionally problematic?  
Although no simple line can be drawn to connect all the dots, it is 
noteworthy that with respect to those mandates that are acknowl-
edged to be constitutionally impermissible, the individual or entity 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985). 
 54 See Magliocca, supra note 35. 
 55 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706 (1977). 
 56 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
 57 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
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being mandated is not contributing to the problem Congress is trying 
to solve in any distinctive way or in a way that explains the extent of 
the mandate.  For example, in the anti-commandeering cases, the 
states that were commandeered were themselves not in any way 
standing as an obstacle to Congress’ ability to otherwise implement its 
regulatory objectives.58  They were, simply put, not part of the prob-
lem Congress was trying to fix, but instead had simply declined to be 
the solution Congress wanted them to be. 
So too for the ban on quartering and the ban on compelled 
speech.  In those instances, Congress might prefer that the individuals 
being mandated assist Congress with its goals, but the mere existence 
of these individuals does not create the problem (the need for troop 
accommodations, or the need for governmental speech) to which 
Congress is reacting, or at least it does not create the kind of problem 
that would explain a focused mandate on those persons in particular.  
Instead, government could be said to be using the mandated persons 
as its own instruments for the accomplishment of an objective not par-
ticularly related to those individuals, except in the sense that they are 
convenient implements.  Even in the takings context, as Professor Jed 
Rubenfeld has creatively and powerfully argued, when the govern-
ment is not “using” private property for its own ends, but rather is 
preventing the private property owner from exporting externalities to 
other people, a taking that triggers a requirement of just compensa-
tion is less likely to be found.59 
On the other hand, military defense, government spending (on 
roads and other infrastructure), and a system of criminal and civil jus-
tice requiring juries — these are all “public goods” in the sense that 
people benefit from them and have an incentive to be free riders un-
less mandated to contribute.  The free riding is itself a big part of the 
problem Congress is trying to solve.  So long as the mandate is “con-
gruent and proportional” (to borrow from another federalism con-
text)60 to the free-rider problem that the very existence of the individ-
uals being mandated is creating, then the mandate seems less objec-
tionable.  This explains why, for example, quartering of troops is dif-
ferent from the draft.  A narrow, focused, and selective mandate on a 
                                                                                                                           
 58 In New York, the State that was conscripted was not producing or disposing of any of 
the problematic radioactive waste, but rather simply declining to regulate it, and in Printz, the 
local law enforcement officers who were improperly commandeered were not contributing to 
the proliferation of handguns but were merely handy personnel the federal government thought 
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 59 See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993). 
 60 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (requiring congruence and pro-
portionality with respect to congressional exercise of power under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
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few homeowners to bear the costs of a military that everyone benefits 
from is not a proportionate response to a free-rider problem in the 
way that a random and broad-based draft that seeks sacrifice from 
thousands, if not millions, of people is.   
When viewed through this prism, the healthcare mandate would 
seem to fall on the permissible side of any implicit constitutional line 
safeguarding against instrumentalization.  As noted earlier, the 
mandate is a response to the free-rider problem, a problem that itself 
is exacerbated by other undoubtedly permissible elements of the 
healthcare reform package.  The individuals mandated are — if not 
subject to the mandate — part of the problem, rather than merely be-
ing a convenient part of a solution to problems created by other folks.   
When we pull the focus back from the mandate provision in par-
ticular, and ask — from the perspective of the Commerce Clause in 
general or the Commerce Clause cases in particular — whether the 
healthcare law is the kind of law we might envision Congress enacting 
under its powers to regulate “commerce among the several states,” 
the challenge to PPACA seems somewhat improbable.  Healthcare is, 
as everyone concedes, a huge and rapidly growing part of the national 
economy, and the part of the national economy that is creating hugely 
daunting challenges to economic and fiscal health more generally.  
And there doesn’t seem to be a real question that Congress is regulat-
ing healthcare at least in significant part because of its economic cen-
trality and the spiraling costs that affect the rest of the country’s eco-
nomic future.  This Act bears almost no big-picture resemblance to 
either of the only two laws struck down in the last 70 years as being 
beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause powers — the Gun Free Schools 
Zone Act, and the Violence Against Women Act.  To the extent that 
Justice Souter was even remotely correct in his dissent in Morrison 
that Lopez and Morrison created a doctrinal “cousin to the intent-
based analysis employed in Hammer v. Dagnehart, but rejected in 
United States v. Heart of Atlanta and United States v. Darby,”61 Lopez 
and Morrison look very little like the present challenges to healthcare.  
In the PPACA, Congress is openly and notoriously regulating mar-
kets, incentives created by markets, and the distributions of commodi-
ties that result from those markets.  
I should add that I think a “cousin to [an] intent-based analysis” 
to limit Congress’ use of the Commerce Clause would not be an illegi-
timate device to employ.  Justice Souter was correct that any intent-
based inquiry was flatly rejected in the cases from the 1960s evaluat-
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ing civil rights anti-discrimination laws, but what he forgot to mention 
was that this rejection was itself flatly inconsistent with the Court’s 
famous admonition in McCulloch that, “[s]hould Congress, under the 
pretext of exercising its powers, pass laws for the accomplishments of 
objects not entrusted to the government, it would become the painful 
duty of [the Supreme Court], should a case requiring such a decision 
come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.”62  
The statutes in Lopez and Morrison were arguably pretextual in this 
way — as far as Commerce powers are concerned — and thus may be 
correctly decided under a reclamation of the majestic McCulloch 
framework. 
D. Doctrinal Examination of Other Powers 
Although most of my thinking on the healthcare litigations con-
cerns Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, I offer a few observations 
on two other plausible grounds for upholding the law — the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, and the taxation power.  With respect to the so-
called sweeping (Necessary and Proper) clause, both Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in Raich and Justice Breyer’s somewhat broadly written 
opinion for the Court in United States v. Comstock63 support Congress’ 
power to create the mandate even if the Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, standing alone, did not.  Whether simply “being” is economic 
activity, and whether Congress is ordinarily limited to regulating eco-
nomic activity under the Commerce Clause, the mandate is a neces-
sary and proper entailment of Congress’ regulation of the healthcare 
insurance industry.  As noted earlier, by prohibiting the insurers from 
discriminating against persons with so-called preexisting conditions, 
Congress has exacerbated the free-rider incentive problem to which 
the mandate is a plausible response.   If regulation of all marijuana 
possession was necessary and proper to prevent some marijuana from 
leaching into the interstate (black) market for drug sales — as Justice 
Scalia reasoned in Raich — then so too imposing the mandate is neces-
sary and proper to making the ban on preexisting-condition discrimi-
nation workable in the healthcare law.  Nor can it possibly matter that 
the problem that Congress is responding to in the mandate was made 
worse by Congress’ own (permissible) regulation of the insurance in-
dustry.64  In Comstock, the Court relied on the fact that Congress ar-
guably made the problem of dealing with sexually deviant ex-felons 
worse by incarcerating them under valid federal criminal laws as a 
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 64 District Court Judge Vinson in Florida clearly erred in suggesting otherwise. 
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reason supporting, rather than undermining, Congress’ power to civil-
ly detain them when states were disinclined to deal with them.65 
As to whether the mandate can be upheld as a tax, I find at least 
some of the arguments advanced by the healthcare Act challengers to 
be problematic.  The fact that Congress didn’t affirmatively point to 
the power to levy taxes (the way it did the power to regulate com-
merce) cannot be a reason why the mandate cannot be upheld as a 
tax.  Nor can the fact that at various points in the law Congress re-
ferred to the payment to the federal Treasury as a penalty.  If the 
mandated payments operate the way taxes operate — by raising reve-
nues to defray costs of providing services to a large class of persons — 
then the fact that Congress didn’t label them as taxes shouldn’t re-
solve the question of whether Congress had the power to levy them.66  
Nor should the fact that Congress didn’t list the mandate provision 
among those measures that would raise revenues; if in fact the 
mandate does raise revenues the way a tax does, then whether Con-
gress anticipated that or not should not defeat congressional power.  
And if the political debate made clear to all citizens that the mandate 
would be imposed else they would pay money to the federal treasury 
— that is, the monetary implications for individuals were clear to all — 
what is the point of insisting that people in Washington, D.C. use the 
“T” word in the congressional debates? 
Another interesting question presented by the tax aspect of these 
challenges might arise if the federal government, for political reasons, 
fails to assert tax power as a plausible foundation for the PPACA.  
Could a court nonetheless uphold the statute on that ground, or is the 
precise basis of federal legislative power a waivable matter? 
II.  THE LARGER POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE 
I close by noting yet another couple of oddities about the health-
care challenge.  The plaintiffs seem to concede that a single-payer 
scheme by which the federal government provides health insurance to 
all and mandates that we all pay into a fund to receive such services 
would be constitutionally permissible.  Single-payer schemes and the 
extension of Medicare to all persons seem to be options that are ac-
cepted as constitutionally permissible.  In terms of the federalism val-
ues served by the Tenth Amendment, why would a scheme that pre-
serves more leeway for state and individual choice be less permissible?  
Again, sometimes making Congress go through certain hurdles will 
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focus attention politically in a way that serves federalism values, but 
in the present case, no one seems unaware of the breadth of what 
Congress was doing and why it was doing it.  As a technical, logical 
matter, the greater power does not always subsume the lesser one.  
But we need an explanation for why the Constitution would prohibit 
something for a set of reasons that are implicated even more directly 
by something the Constitution permits.  The Constitution may be im-
perfect, but we should not construe its limitations as being arbitrary 
and unreasoned absent text that gives us no choice. 
As to what will happen to these litigations as they move up the 
appellate ladder, I am not inclined to predict.  I will say that the dis-
trict court opinions invalidating the measure mean, as a legal matter, 
very little.  On questions of pure law, district court opinions are little 
more than placeholders.  And district judges can get away with saying 
a lot of stupid things, both because what they say as to the law doesn’t 
usually matter much, and because there is no dissent filed at the same 
time as their opinion pointing out the weaknesses in their reasoning.  
That is not true at the Court of Appeals level, which is obviously a 
much more important forum.  When we move outside of the judicial 
arena to the academy, it is noteworthy that to date very few of the 
top-tier conservative constitutional analysts at the nation’s top twen-
ty-five, or so, law schools seem to be willing to say on the record that 
they think the challenge should prevail.  But cases like this build in 
momentum, and in that respect, the lower court rulings may matter a 
lot in the real world as people become more willing to climb onto the 
bandwagon. 
If and when the vehicle arrives at the Supreme Court, it’s hard to 
count many noses against the statute at present.  Justice Thomas, per-
haps.  But beyond that, it’s difficult to see any sure votes to invalidate.  
And to win, the challengers will most likely have to persuade Justice 
Kennedy.  That might be a tall order.  In addition to being sensitive to 
important nationalist issues,67 (and in this regard, I should say I think 
neither the Gun-Free Schools Zones Act nor the Violence Against 
Women Act involved the kind of nationalist issue presented here), 
Justice Kennedy has a knack for being on the right side of history.  
And does anyone doubt that the healthcare law, or something very 
much like it (if not more aggressive) is inevitable in America as the 
next generation grapples with spiraling healthcare costs? 
Finally, this does not seem to be the kind of dispute that the 
Court needs to resolve for fear that the political process is inattentive 
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or otherwise incapable of error correction.  Two elections (2008 and 
2010) were fought largely over this measure, and a third election 
(2012) will feature the law prominently for the people’s approval or 
rejection.  To the extent that the Court feels more justified in inter-
vening when the channels of political change are clogged or polluted, 
this does not appear to be such an instance.  
 
